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A Commonwealth Religious Discrimination Act for Australia?
Abstract
There have been a number of attempts to create a constitutional bill of rights in Australia, but all have
failed. The most recent exploration of the idea of a constitutional bill of rights by the Rudd government in
2010 stalled because of church opposition. Yet Australia has embraced international norms outlawing
racial and sexual discrimination passed as ordinary legislation using the Commonwealth’s external affairs
power.
This paper discusses whether religious freedom is a norm sufficiently well established in international law
that it could also be passed as ordinary legislation in Australia. It then investigates what an Australian
religious freedom law might look like and whether it could be crafted so as to allay the church opposition
which has shut down previous attempts to create a constitutional bill of rights.
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A Commonwealth Religious Discrimination Act for Australia?
Keith Thompson
I.

Introduction

This paper observes that even though the Commonwealth of Australia has
unsuccessfully tried to implement a full range of human rights in the Constitution on a
number of occasions, the Parliament already has the power to implement human rights
in Australian domestic law by virtue of the external affairs power in the Constitution.
That power has previously enabled comprehensive legislation in relation to race, gender
equality and workers’ rights.
Separate Commonwealth laws could be passed for each human right in the
international human rights instruments that Australia has ratified. That is what
happened with the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), the Sexual Discrimination
Act 1984 (Cth) and the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth). Alternatively, a
comprehensive Human Rights Act that mirrored or was premised on the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the Covenants on Civil and Political, and
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICCPR and ICESCR) could be undertaken. The
individual rights approach seems more likely to succeed since it worked in 1975, 1984
and 1988 while attempts to protect human rights as a whole by placing them in the
Constitution have always failed. The legislation of individual human rights would
enable specific debate about that right and avoid the generalised opposition that arises
in Australia when a comprehensive constitutional bill of rights has been proposed. This
individual approach could also tailor human rights to Australian requirements rather
than simply adopt overseas boilerplates.
My suggestion in this article is that our next human rights implementation effort
should focus on freedom of religious belief and practice. I make that suggestion because
it is arguably the most foundational human right that is not yet protected in Australia
and because concerns with the adequate protection of this right have seen religious
organisations oppose previous attempts to create a constitutional Bill of Rights in
Australia. Freedom of conscience and belief was also the subject of an international
declaration which was ratified by Australia in 1993,1 a declaration that the Australian
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) recommended that
Australia should implement in 1998 though that recommendation has not yet been
followed.2 If religious organisations were convinced to support a detailed and specific
Commonwealth Act protecting religious belief and practice as part of conscience, then
it is possible that organized religion might later support other elements of the human
rights project.
1

Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion
or Belief, (the ‘Religion Declaration’) Proclaimed by General Assembly of the United Nations on 25
November 1981 (resolution 36/55); reaffirmed by the United Nations by resolution 48/128 in 1993, and
declared “an international instrument relating to human rights and freedoms for the purposes of the
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) by Michael John Duffy as
Commonwealth Attorney-General on February 8, 1993.
2
Article 18, Freedom of religion and belief, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission,
Australia, 1998.
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I address this task in two parts. First, I explain why the Commonwealth Parliament
already has the power to implement such legislation even though previous attempts to
enact a constitutional bill of rights have always foundered. That discussion will focus
on previous High Court jurisprudence surrounding the Commonwealth Executive and
Parliament’s external affairs’ power to implement declarations, treaties and
conventions which manifest ‘international concerns’. In Part II, I suggest why freedom
of conscience and belief should be Australia’s next federal human rights project. In
part, that is because religious organisations and individual religious believers in
Australia have been concerned that freedom of conscience and belief is not and cannot
be adequately protected by human rights laws. To answer that concern, I show that
religious freedom legislation need not follow the brief generalities of familiar human
rights precedents, but can be tailored to answer specific concerns.
I then suggest that the protection of minority freedom of conscience and religion in
a comprehensive Religious Freedom Act would contribute to a more favourable view
of human rights legislation generally in Australia and in time, could lead to the more
complete domestic implementation of the ICCPR. I acknowledge that secular liberal
elites in Australia will reject my suggestion that a comprehensive Religious Freedom
Act, would enhance the quality of Australian society. I also acknowledge that some
believe that a just Australian society would be more quickly achieved if homogenous
belief were coerced by the suppression of all speech and action that vilified or offended
minorities. Without canvassing the voluminous literature which exists around that
argument, I explain why I believe that a tolerant and respectful society is the more likely
product of a society which fully respects freedom of conscience and belief where that
belief does not interfere with public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental
rights and freedoms of others.
I conclude that Australian experience with the Racial Discrimination Act 1975
(Cth) and the Sexual Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) confirm that a Commonwealth
Religious Freedom Act could answer the concerns of organized religion about freedom
of religious belief and practice in Australia. Such legislation could also give judges
clear direction on how anti-discrimination legislation should be interpreted when it
conflicted with religious freedom consistent with Australia’s international
commitments under the ICCPR and the Religion Declaration.
II.

Commonwealth Legislative Power

The High Court has consistently held that international legal obligations have no
effect in Australian domestic law until they are given effect through Australian
domestic legislation.3 The High Court recognized as early as 1949, that domestic
Australian legislation could be justified under the external affairs power if such
legislation was necessary to prevent sedition against any of Australia’s allies.4 The

3

In Chow Hung Ching v The King (1948) 77 CLR 449, Dixon J said that the ratifying of a treaty only
committed externally and had “no legal effect upon the rights and duties of the subjects of the Crown”
(ibid 477-478). The High Court has followed this view in many subsequent cases including Dietrich v
The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 (per Mason CJ and McHugh J) and Kiao v West (1985) 159 CLR 550
(per Gibbs CJ).
4
R v Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121, 136-137
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majority of the Court built upon that reasoning in the Seas and Submerged Lands Case5
when it decided in 1975 that the external affairs power justified Australia’s assertion of
sovereignty over submerged sea-bed land in the continental shelf well beyond the
traditional 12 mile limit. But there has been continuing diversity as to whether the
external affairs power is engaged in cases of ‘mere externality’, if the underlying
matters were merely issues of ‘international concern’, or whether Australia must have
also accepted obligations under a formal international treaty.6 What is now settled and
is most relevant for the purposes of this article, is that following the Tasmanian Dam7
and Industrial Relations Act8 cases, Australian domestic legislation can always be
justified under s 51(xxix) if that legislation is necessary to implement a commitment
that Australia has made in a treaty. Perhaps the first step in that direction was taken in
the decision in Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen where the High Court rejected
Queensland’s challenge to the validity of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth)
which had been passed to implement Australia’s obligations under the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.9
Even though the Koowarta decision is more than 30 years old, and several other
panels of the High Court have considered the reach of the external affairs power since,
that decision along with the decision in the Industrial Relations Act case10 arguably
provide the last High Court word on the question of how closely follow-on
Commonwealth domestic legislation must track the relevant treaty to be a valid exercise
of the external affairs power in s 51(xxix). The following discussion of the scope of the
external affairs power outlined in Koowarta and in the Industrial Relations Act case,

5

New South Wales v Commonwealth (Seas and Submerged Lands Case) (1975) 135 CLR 337. Note
that while “the whole Court” found “that the provisions of the [Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973
(Cth)] relating to the continental shelf were within the legislative power of the Commonwealth under s.
51(xxix) of the Constitution” (ibid 338, headnote [1]), there was diversity as to whether that power
arose because of the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the law of the sea, because of the power to authorize
laws “with respect to Australia’s relationships with foreign countries” (ibid headnote [2]), or merely on
the ground that the waterways concerned were external to Australia.
6
For example, note that Brennan J in Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (War Crimes Act Case) (1991)
172 CLR 501 thought that mere externality was not enough to engage the external affairs legislative
power; there must additionally be a ‘sufficient Australian connection’ (ibid, 550-552), and though he
agreed with the majority in the Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1 that the external affairs power
could be used to implement any treaty obligation assumed by Australia, he maintained that there must
be strict conformity with the treaty obligations. In the different factual context of XYZ v
Commonwealth (2006) 227 CLR 532, Callinan and Heydon JJ rejected the argument that Australia
domestic legislation could be justified under s 51(xxix) solely on the grounds of geographic externality.
They considered instead that the constitutional ‘external affairs’ phrase, only authorised legislation
necessary to preserve Australia’s relationships with other countries (ibid , 586-592). Winterton’s most
recent editors have accordingly questioned whether it is correct to assert that the High Court has
accepted Evatt and McTiernan JJ’s assertion in R v Burgess; Ex parte Henry (1936) 55 CLR 608, 687
that the external affairs power extends to authorise domestic legislation to implement mere
international recommendations or draft international conventions (Winterton’s Australian Federal
Constitutional Law, Commentary and Materials, Peter Gerangelos (General Editor), 3 rd ed, Lawbook
Co., Pyrmont, NSW, 2013, 648).
7
Commonwealth v Tasmania (Tasmanian Dam Case) (1983) 158 CLR 1.
8
Victoria v Commonwealth (Industrial Relations Act Case) (1996) 187 CLR 416.
9
Opened for signature 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195; entered into force 4 January 1969, and
ratified by Australia on 30 September 1975 which is the same day as the Racial Discrimination Act
1975 (Cth) was passed.
10
Victoria v Commonwealth (Industrial Relations Act Case) (1996) 187 CLR 416.
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will also review the Full Federal Court’s subsequent treatment of the same issues in
Toben v Jones in 2003.11
The scope of the external affairs power in the ‘Koowarta’ and ‘Industrial Relations
Act’ cases
John Koowarta challenged the Queensland Government’s refusal to transfer a lease
of Wik homelands to him as a member of the Wik aboriginal nation as a breach of the
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). Queensland defended by asserting that the
Commonwealth Government did not have constitutional power to pass the Racial
Discrimination Act 1975 upon which Mr Koowarta relied. Gibbs CJ said that
[t]he crucial question in the case [wa]s whether under the power given by s.
51(xxix) the Parliament can enact laws for the execution of any treaty to which
it is a party, whatever its subject-matter, and in particular for the execution of a
treaty which deals with matters that are purely domestic and in themselves
involve no relationship with other countries or their inhabitants.12
Gibbs CJ was concerned that too liberal an interpretation of s 51(xxix) would remove
“[n]early all the limitations imposed upon Commonwealth power by
the…Constitution” and engage “a unitary system of government”13 and so found that
an international agreement w[ould] only be a valid law under s. 51 (xxix) if the
agreement [wa]s with respect to a matter which itself c[ould] be described as an
external affair…[and] if the provisions to which it g[ave] effect answer that
description.14
Because “[a]n Australian law…designed to forbid racial discrimination by Australians
against Australians within the territory of Australia [was not]…international in
character”,15 “ss. 9 and 12 of the Act were not within the legislative power conferred
by s. 51(xxix) and [we]re invalid”.16
While Aickin and Wilson JJ agreed with the Chief Justice, Stephen, Mason,
Murphy and Brennan JJ did not. They interpreted the Commonwealth’s power under s
51(xxix) more liberally. Stephen J said that because areas of international concern were
“ever expanding”17 and “because Australia had assumed an international obligation to
suppress all forms of racial discrimination [which norm had become]…part of
customary international law…the subject of racial discrimination should be regarded
as an important aspect of Australia’s external affairs”.18 There was also “a quite precise
treaty obligation…which call[ed] for domestic implementation within Australia.”19

11

Toben v Jones (2003) 199 ALR 1.
Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168, 192 [23].
13
Ibid 199 [29].
14
Ibid 200 [31].
15
Ibid 202 [34].
16
Ibid 203 [36].
17
Ibid 217 [25].
18
Ibid 220 [35].
19
Ibid 221 [36].
12
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For Mason J, because the Commonwealth powers in s 51 were plenary, they
were “to be construed liberally, not narrowly and pedantically”.20 He continued that the
power to pass laws implementing treaties passed by virtue of the external affairs power
only required the Court to determine whether the relevant treaty was genuine.21 It was
illegitimate to approach any question of interpretation of Commonwealth power
on the footing that an expansive construction should be rejected because it will
effectively deprive the States of a power which has hitherto been exercised or
could be exercised by them.22
As O’Connor J had said in Jumbunna Coal in 1908,
the Court should, in my opinion, always lean to the broader interpretation unless
there is something in the context or in the rest of the Constitution to indicate
that the narrower interpretation will best carry out its object and purpose.23
For Mason J, “the existence of a treaty [wa]s [not] an essential pre-requisite to
the exercise”24 of the Commonwealth’s power in s 51(xxix). Following the High
Court’s reasoning in Burgess and Airlines (No. 2), that power might be exercised if a
matter had “becom[e] the topic of international debate, discussion and negotiation”25
and it certainly covered “the implementation of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.”26
For Murphy J, “there [wa]s an external affair whenever Australia [wa]s involved
with any affair…outside Australia”.27 In the case of the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, because Australia had been complaining almost
daily about “violations of human rights in other countries…[t]he Executive
Government's concern with racial discrimination in Australia [wa]s related, perhaps
inextricably, to its concern with racial discrimination elsewhere”28 and brought the
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) “easily within the external affairs power as an
implementation of this treaty.”29
For Brennan J, s 51(xxix) was “available to support [a] law” “[w]hen the
subject-matter of [the] law [wa]s the subject of a treaty obligation and [wa]s
‘indisputably international in character’”.30 Though “a colourable attempt to convert a
matter of internal concern into an external affair would fail”,31 quoting Windeyer J in

20

Ibid 223 [5].
Ibid 224 [6].
22
Ibid 226 [14].
23
Ibid 227 [15] quoting O’Connor J in Jumbunna Coal Mine N.L. v. Victorian Coal Miners'
Association (1908) 6 CLR 309, 368.
24
Ibid 234 [30].
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid 234 [31-32].
27
Ibid 237 [2].
28
Ibid 239 [10].
29
Ibid 241 [13].
30
Ibid 256 [8].
31
Ibid 260 [14].
21
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Airlines (No. 2), "a law necessary to give effect to a particular treaty obligation of the
Commonwealth is a law with respect to external affairs."32
However, Brennan J was explicit in the Polyukhovich33 case nine years later
against all his brethren on that Court, that the Commonwealth was not empowered by
s 51(xxix) to pass laws about just anything external to Australia. In that later case, he
said the Commonwealth had to demonstrate an Australian nexus – “[t]he ‘affairs’ which
[we]re the subject matter of the power, [we]re…the external affairs of Australia, not
affairs which have nothing to do with Australia”.34 The problem with the laws in the
Polyukhovich case was that they retrospectively criminalized actions that had taken
place wholly outside Australia before Polyukhovich was an Australian resident or
citizen. But Brennan J was satisfied with the Australian connection with the treaty in
the Koowarta case. In that case, he also explained how the Australian domestic law
must conform to the provisions of the treaty which the domestic law was implementing.
He said:
It remains to inquire whether ss. 9 and 12 of the Act, which are the only
provisions upon which Mr Koowarta’s claim for relief might depend, were
enacted in performance of Australia’s obligation under the Convention. It was
righly conceded that ss. 9 and 12 were enacted in implementation of the
Convention. If there were a disconformity between ss. 9 and 12 on the one hand
and the Convention obligation on the other, the Convention obligation might
fail to stamp the character of an external affair upon some part of the subjectmatter of ss. 9 and 12, and further consideration would have to be given to their
validity (cf. R. v. Burgess; Ex parte Henry; Airlines of N.S.W.[No.2], esp. per
Menzies J. (48).
If there had been a material disconformity, it may have been necessary to
consider whether any parts of ss. 9 amd 12 which were not in implementation
of the Convention might have been supported as an appropriate legislative
means of performing an obligation to elimination racial discrimination as an
obligation binding in international law dehors the Convention. It is unnecessary
to examine the nexus between a non-treaty obligation and a law enacted in
purported reliance on par. (xxix) in performance of such an obligation. I would
defer that examination until the circumstances of some particular case require
it. It suffices in this case that ss. 9 and 12 were enacted in performance of the
Convention obligation and therefore valid.35
Changes in the composition of the Court between 1983 and 1996 saw a much
more unified decision in the Industrial Relations Act Case in 1996. In that case, the
question was whether the Commonwealth had power under s 51 (xxix) of the
Constitution to pass amendments to the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) by virtue
of various international Conventions and Recommendations which the Executive had
ratified and whether the domestic laws that had been passed sufficiently conformed to
those international Conventions and Recommendations. The joint judgment of Brennan
CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ found that

32

Ibid 258 [12].
Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (War Crimes Case) (1991) 172 CLR 501.
34
Ibid 550-551.
35
Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168, 260-261.
33
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[i]t would be a serious error to construe part (xxix) as though the subject matter
of those relations to which it applied in 1900 were not continually expanding.36
Despite his dissent in the Tasmanian Dam case because the continuing
expansion of s 51 (xxix) left the external affairs power open-ended as a matter of
constitutional theory,37 even Dawson J concurred in a separate judgment.
In the words of the joint majority
To be a law with respect to ‘external affairs’, the law must be reasonably
capable of being considered appropriate and adapted to implementing the
treaty.38
However, in the Industrial Relations Act Case, the Court held that some of the
provisions in the follow-on legislation were invalid because they were not ‘appropriate
and adapted’ to the purpose of the international instruments relied on in that case.39
Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ explained:
When a treaty is relied on under s 51(xxix) to support a law, it is not sufficient
that the law prescribes one of a variety of means that might be thought
appropriate and adapted to the achievement of an ideal. The law must prescribe
a regime that the treaty has itself defined with sufficient specificity to direct the
general course to be taken by the signatory states…
To be a law with respect to ‘external affairs’, the law must be reasonably
capable to being considered appropriate and adapted to implementing the
treaty…
It has been said that a law will not be capable of being seen as appropriate and
adapted in the necessary sense unless it appears that there is ‘reasonable
proportionality’ between that purpose or object and the means adapted by the
law to pursue it. The notion of ‘reasonable proportionality’ will not always be
particularly helpful….whether the law selects means which are reasonably
capable of being considered appropriate and adapted to achieving the purpose
or object of giving effect to the treaty, so that the law is one upon a subject
which is an aspect of external affairs.40
In this case, the provisions in the Commonwealth’s follow-on legislation
prevented the termination of employment without valid reason or where the termination
was ‘harsh, just or unconscionable’. The addition of the requirement that otherwise
valid terminations not be ‘harsh, just or unconscionable’ went beyond the requirements
of the Convention and to that extent were invalid. The lesson is thus that it is necessary
to ensure that the drafting of the domestic follow-on legislation is consistent with the

36

Victoria v Commonwealth (Industrial Relations Act Case) 1996 187 CLR 416, 482.
Sir Daryl Dawson, “The Constitution – Major Overhaul or Simple Tune-up?” (1984) 14 Melbourne
University Law Review 353, 358.
38
Victoria v Commonwealth (Industrial Relations Act Case) 1996 187 CLR 416, 486.
39
For example, the provisions in the Commonwealth’s follow-on legislation that prevented the
termination of employment without valid reason or where the termination was ‘harsh, just or
unconscionable’ were invalid but severable (ibid 517-518).
40
Ibid 486-488.
37

Published by ResearchOnline@ND, 2017

7

Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3

international instrument being followed.
The lesson from the Industrial Relations Case is that the domestic follow-on
legislation passed to implement the obligations that Australia has accepted under the
relevant international instrument, must follow the terms of that instrument closely to
count as a valid and reasonably adapted implementation of those treaty obligations in
Australia.
Would a Religious Freedom Act be valid under the Australian Constitution?
That discussion brings us to the question of whether the Commonwealth has power
to pass domestic legislation to implement its commitments under the Religion
Declaration referred to above at note 1. Given that Australia ratified the ICCPR in
1980, it is not necessary to further consider whether protecting the religious freedom of
Australia’s residents is a matter of sufficient international concern to enliven the
Commonwealth’s power to pass follow-on domestic implementation legislation under
the external affairs power in s 51 (xxix). That power is now beyond doubt given the
authority of the decisions in the Tasmanian Dam and Industrial Relations Act cases and
the residual question is thus what such follow-on legislation should look like to satisfy
the rule that it was ‘appropriate and adapted’ to the purpose of the international
instruments relied on – namely the ICCPR and the Religion Declaration. Because the
power of the Commonwealth Parliament to pass a Religious Freedom Act has been by
Australia’s Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission in its 1998 Report, I
briefly set out the reasoning before I pass on to the residual question of what a
Commonwealth Religious Freedom could or should look like. The Commission opined
The Australian Constitution gives the Commonwealth power to make laws with
respect to external affairs. This head of power enables the Commonwealth to
make a law implementing an international treaty ratified or acceded to by
Australia provided the law gives effect to the terms of the instrument in a
reasonably appropriate and proportional way.
Australia has ratified or otherwise indicated its support for a number of
international instruments in the area of human rights. Some of them clearly
foreshadow that they will be implemented through domestic legislation. ICCPR
article 2 requires Australia to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the ICCPR, to
take the necessary steps ... to adopt such legislative or other measures as may
be necessary to give effect to the rights recognised in the ... Covenant and to
ensure that any persons whose rights or freedoms ... are violated ... have an
effective remedy. The Religion Declaration article 7 provides
The rights and freedoms set forth in the present Declaration shall be
accorded in national legislation in such a manner that everyone shall be
able to avail himself of such rights and freedoms in practice.41
The Attorney-General’s declaration that the Religion Declaration is an
41

Article 18, Freedom of religion and belief, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission,
Australia, 1998, 13.
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international instrument for the purposes of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission Act 1986 (Cth) is strong evidence that the Religion Declaration is a matter
of sufficient concern to justify the passage of follow-on legislation under s 51(xxix) of
the Australian Constitution. But even without the Attorney-General’s declaration
referred to above,42 Australia’s ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights 1966 (the ICCPR) on 13 August 1980 including its affirmation of
freedom of religion and belief in Article 18, puts the matter beyond doubt. That is
because Australia agreed under the ICCPR to ensure those rights to all individuals
within its territory,43 to adopt legislation that will more fully enable those rights44 and
because the ICCPR has now arguably been accepted as creating enforceable
international law.45
While the High Court has not been required to further consider what legislation
satisfies the ‘appropriate and adapted’ interpretive rule since the Industrial Relations
Act Case in 1996, the Federal Court was required to adjudicate related issues in Toben
v Jones in 200346 and that Court’s treatment of the ‘appropriate and adapted’
requirement is instructive.
Frederick Toben had challenged the validity of orders made by the Federal
Court to enforce determinations earlier made by the Human Rights and Equal
Opportunity Commission in 2000. Those orders had confirmed that various of his
publications on a website as Director of the Adelaide Institute, had vilified Jews in
breach of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) as amended in 1995. Toben
appealed Branson J’s 2002 orders in the Federal Court to the Full Federal Court. He
alleged that the 1995 amendments to Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) exceeded
the legislative power of the Commonwealth under s 51(xxix) because the Racial
Discrimination Convention47 relied on as the foundation of that legislative power, “was
only intended to proscribe acts which could be characterised as expressions of racial
hatred.”48
While the Court agreed that “Part IIA of the Act d[id] not fully implement the
Convention”,49 the Convention and other international instruments which Australia was
obliged to enforce, were also
42

Ibid.
ICCPR, Preamble and Article 2.
44
Ibid, Article 2(2) and 3.
45
“[M]any international lawyers argue that the [Universal] Declaration [of Human Rights] has come to
form part of customary international law and in this way can be seen as binding on all
nations…Australia has ratified both Covenants [the ICCPR and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights] and thereby agreed to assume the obligations they set out.”
(George Williams, Sean Brennan and Andrew Lynch, Blackshield & Williams Australian
Constitutional Law & Theory, 6th ed., The Federation Press, 2014, 1134-1135). However as explained
above in the text, these international obligations do not become binding in Australian domestic law
until follow-on implementation legislation is passed by the Commonwealth Parliament.
46
Toben v Jones (2003) 199 ALR 1.
47
The International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (the Racial
Discrimination Convention) adopted and opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly
resolution 2106 on 21 December 1965 and entered into force on 4 January 1969 in accordance with
Article 19; ratified by Australia on 30 September 1975 and used as the basis for the passage of the
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) the same day.
48
Toben v Jones (2003) 199 ALR 1, 9 [16] per Carr J.
49
Ibid.
43
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directed at deterring public expressions of offensive racial prejudice which
might lead to acts of racial hatred and discrimination…[A] state party [c]ould
legislate to ‘nip in the bud’ the doing of offensive, insulting, humiliating or
intimidating public acts which are done because of race, colour or national or
ethnic origin before such acts can grow into incitement or promotion of racial
hatred or discrimination.50
Citing the joint judgment in the Industrial Relations Act Case, Carr J continued
that “it [wa]s for the legislature to choose the means by which it carrie[d] into or g[a]ve
effect to a treaty”.51 Kiefel J concurred with Carr J on the constitutional issues arising,
but Allsop J took judicial notice of the context when the Convention was conceived and
then observed that State parties had agreed to rapidly pursue “a policy of eliminating
racial discrimination in all its forms and promoting understanding among all races” by
“all appropriate means”.52
Allsop J went on to observe that Article 4(ii) of the Racial Discrimination
Convention expected “immediate and positive measures”53 and Article 4(iii) expected
States Parties “to declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based
on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as acts of
violence or incitement to such acts”.54 His Honour noted concern in the Commonwealth
Parliament in 1974 and 1983 about how such measures would erode freedom of speech,
and he noted the repetition of those concerns in the early 1990s.55 Proposed criminal
sanctions were ultimately rejected, but the 1994 Bill made “acts unlawful which
reasonably caused offence”.56 These amendments were made to “strengthen…social
cohesion and [to] prevent…the undermining of tolerance in the Australian
community”.57 He also cited the Attorney-General’s speech when the Amendment Bill
was presented to the Parliament,58 but despite the appellant’s contention that the Act
should be read down to “encompass only the expression of racial hatred”,59 “the context
and aim of the Convention were” the elimination of racial discrimination in all its
forms.60 “Absence of precision in the treaty…d[id] not lead to…a lack of obligation”
on State Parties.61 Neither was “a deficiency” in the implementation of the
Convention’s regime “fatal” to the constitutional validity of the implementing Act
unless that deficiency was “so substantial as to deny the law the character of a measure
implementing the Convention”.62 The law which the Commonwealth Parliament had
passed was “reasonably capable of being considered as appropriate and adapted to
implement the obligations” which arose under the Convention.63 While the law the
Commonwealth had passed was “only one means of the achievement of the ideal”, it
50

Ibid 10 [19].
Ibid 10 [20] citing the Industrial Relations Act Case (1986), 487.
52
Ibid 24 [104] citing Article 2(ii) of the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination (1965).
53
Ibid 24 [107].
54
Ibid 21 [88].
55
Ibid 26 [114-117].
56
Ibid 31 [128].
57
Ibid 31 [129] quoting the Explanatory Memorandum to the 1995 Amendment Act.
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was not inconsistent with the relevant part of the Convention.64 The balance to be struck
“between freedom of speech and expressions of intimidation and hate” was “to be
struck by Parliament”.65
While the High Court in the Industrial Relations Act Case found that some
provisions in the follow-on legislation in that case were not ‘appropriate and adapted’
to the purpose of the international instruments relied on, the Full Federal Court in Toben
v Jones found that the 1995 amendments to the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth)
were ‘appropriate and adapted’. It did not matter that the amendments did not track the
international convention exactly or were only partial because it could not be said that
the non-alignment was “so substantial as to deny the law the character of a measure
implementing the Convention.”66 It was for the Commonwealth Parliament to strike the
appropriate domestic implementation balance for the Racial Discrimination
Convention in Australia.
Commonwealth legislation implementing international human rights
instruments also has considerable potential to shape law and attitudes throughout
Australia. For even though the Commonwealth legislature did not intend that the Racial
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) should override racial protection provisions in the later
Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), the High Court held that they did in Viskausas v
Nilaud.67 The Commonwealth then amended its legislation in an effort to save the
additional protection afforded by the New South Wales legislation,68 but that
amendment and the further litigation that followed,69 confirmed that federal antidiscrimination legislation will readily be interpreted by the High Court as creating a
code that covers the field trumping state legislation that is in any way inconsistent with
it.
The decisions of both courts confirm that the power of the Commonwealth
Parliament to legislate with respect to external affairs is not unlimited, but allows our
legislators a ‘margin of appreciation’ to design legislation in a manner that meets
Australian needs, even if that involves the partial or progressive implementation of the
treaty obligations. What the Commonwealth Parliament cannot legislate is a regime
that bears the name of an international convention but has no relationship to its terms.
With this understanding of the Commonwealth Parliament’s power to pass domestic
laws implementing Article 18 of the ICCPR and the Religion Declaration, I will now
discuss why the domestic legislation of a comprehensive Religious Freedom Act should
be Australia’s next human rights project.
III.

Why should we now pass religious freedom legislation in Australia?

In essence the answer to this question is that the human rights project in
Australia has stalled because of distrust and can only be jump started if religious
objection is engaged, understood and respectfully accommodated. But before we can
64
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discuss how that might be done, we need to understand why the development of human
rights in Australia has slowed so much when there was genuine enthusiasm when the
UDHR was originally expressed. However, because I want to focus on freedom of
religion and conscience, I will not discuss Australia’s original antipathy towards racial
toleration and equality nor how that was resolved on paper. I observe only that although
freedom of religion and conscience got off to a better start, Australia has returned to its
hesitant 1901 form.
Freedom of Religion and Belief in Australia
There are a variety of reasons why Australia has resisted human rights
legislation in the past. Most recently the Rudd government rejected the Brennan
Committee’s “31 recommendations…for improving and promoting human rights in
Australia….[because] this would be divisive”.70 Some commentators have suggested
the primary reasons for the rejection were seated deep within the Labor party itself.71
Others have pointed to the continuing concerns of the churches.72 Patrick Parkinson has
published reasons for those “Christian Concerns”73 and I will review those reasons
because they are representative of religious objection generally and because it seems
pointless to seek to protect the conscience rights of Australian religious believers if the
majority of them are unsupportive for enduring legitimate reasons. However, I observe
as a general principle, that human resistance to change because it is uncomfortable does
not present as a worthy reason for resisting change that could improve important
outcomes in any society.
Political doubts about implementing human rights in Australia
‘Labor Party’ resistance to change has been attributed to persuasive elements
within the party which believed that human rights are anti-democratic and obstructive
of efficient executive government management. The anti-democratic argument holds
that Bills of Rights transfer a measure of government control from the elected members
of the Parliament to ‘unelected judges’ who can then subvert Executive government
action mandated by the electorate. The argument continues that under Australia’s
Westminster form of democratic government, the Parliament should always be
sovereign and that no judge should be able to tell the Parliament that it has overstepped.
70

Blackshield and Williams, above n 45, 1147-1148.
<http://treatyrepublic.net/content/rudd-government-rejects-human-rights-charter>
In fact, the most vehement opposition to a charter came from within the Labor Party,
spearheaded by former New South Wales Premier Bob Carr. During his decade in office from
1995 to 2005, Carr instituted a series of "law and order" measures, handing unprecedented
powers to the police, boosting the state's jail population to record levels and backing the
introduction of matching federal and state "anti-terrorism" legislation.
Carr and other Labor figures demagogically claimed that any human rights law would hand
power to "unelected" judges and override parliamentary sovereignty. In reality, their
objections are to any restriction, however perfunctory, on the increasing tendency of executive
governments to ram police-state measures through parliament, under the false pretence of
protecting ordinary people from crime and terrorism.
72
Carolyn Maree Evans, Legal Protection of Freedom of Religion in Australia, The Federation Press,
Leichardt, New South Wales, 1990, 167 citing Patrick Parkinson, “Christian Concerns about an
Australian Charter of Rights”, (2010) 15(2) Australian Journal of Human Rights 87
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Parkinson, above n 72. See also Patrick Parkinson, “Religious vilification, anti-discrimination laws
and religious minorities in Australia: The freedom to be different”, (2007) 81 Australian Law Journal
954, and Joel Harrison and Patrick Parkinson, “Freedom Beyond the Commons: Managing the Tension
between Faith and Equality in a Multicultural Society”, 40 Monash Law Review, 2, 413.
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While it is not the purpose of this paper to review the philosophical foundations of this
argument, it is appropriate to observe that New Zealand and the United Kingdom have
experimented with Human Rights Act protection models that are respectful of
traditional Westminster parliamentary sovereignty but which have arguably improved
human rights outcomes in both countries.74 While domestic Bills of Rights in the ACT
and Victoria have not yet earned unequivocal pass marks when it comes to improving
human rights outcomes in those jurisdictions, few have suggested that human rights
generally are less protected in the ACT and Victoria than they were before their
Charters of Rights were enacted. It is also appropriate to observe that Australia diluted
parliamentary sovereignty in favour of the judiciary in a limited way at federation more
than a century ago, and again, there has been no chorus of criticism suggesting that this
limited dilution of the Diceyan ideal has had catastrophic consequences.
Still it is impractical to ignore the lobbying power of elements within the
political system resistant to change or the public apathy towards freedom of conscience
and religion in generations raised without serious ideological bloodshed close at hand.75
But what of the Christian objection that legislated or constitutionalized human rights
never end up protecting religious liberty? What are those arguments and are there
answers?
Religious doubts about implementing human rights in Australia
Carolyn Evans outlined the primary concern of religious organisations about
human rights legislation when she wrote about non-discrimination laws in 2012.76 She
said
Most non-discrimination regimes, including Australia’s, began with quite
substantial exemptions for religious bodies from the provisions of at least some
of the discrimination laws….Over time, however, many countries, particularly
in Europe, have seen the scope of exemptions for religious groups narrow. There
has been increasing public debate in Australia over whether the exemptions in
Australian discrimination Acts should likewise be narrowed.77
The concern of religious organisations is that religious freedom gets diluted as
newer demands for equality claim that religious exemptions are privileges that are
inconsistent with open-ended equality. Evans then distinguishes between exemptions
and exceptions. She uses the term ‘exception’ “to refer to provisions in the law that
explicitly exclude a religious group from the operation of some or all of the
requirements of the non-discrimination law.”78 Exemptions permit religious bodies “to
discriminate with respect to a particular circumstance.”79 Religious bodies argue that
contemporary demands for new ‘equalities’ seldom take a long term view and the
human rights journey is thus punctuated with the continual erosion of individual
74

See for example, Blackshield and Williams, above n 45, 1141 citing the New Zealand Bill of Rights
Act 1990 (NZ) and the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK).
75
Writing in an American context, Martha Nussbaum has observed that the origins and wisdom of
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(Martha C. Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience, Basic Books, New York, 2008, 361).
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conscience and religious group autonomy. Stand-alone claims that religious exceptions
and exemptions are privileges and are unfair, never adequately balance the identity and
dignity interests of religious conscience against trendy contemporary demands.
Professor Patrick Parkinson has added that even though churches want human
rights recognized, they do not believe that Charters assist.80 Their concerns stem from
the perception that current standard form Charters “may be used to support agendas
hostile to religious freedom”, do not always “enact the grounds of limitation contained
in Article 18” of the ICCPR, and that “governmental human rights organisations [can
be]…rather selective about the human rights they choose to support.”81 He says that
the heart of Christian concerns…is that secular liberal interpretations of human
rights Charters will tend to relegate religious freedom to the lowest place in an
implicit hierarchy of rights established not by international law, but by the
intellectual fashions of the day.82
Although most Christian organisations support the ideology of antidiscrimination law, the narrow interpretive approach taken by the institutions
implementing any new version of equality to ‘genuine occupational requirements’ for
jobs in church institutions, see the Christian “moral code”83 sidelined. If the government
or its supervising human rights institutions consider society’s interest in promoting the
new equality is sufficiently compelling, then they “curtail religious freedom”84 to the
extent required to achieve the government goal despite lofty pronouncements about the
foundationality and even the non-derogability of freedom of conscience and religion.
Quoting McConnell, Parkinson says that even though governments assert that they do
not take sides when religious and philosophical differences arise in society, the more
recent idea that all citizens and their institutions also need to be neutral, prevents
religious believers standing for anything they consider important.85
In the context of an evangelical school “established to provide an explicitly
Christian environment for children and young people”,86 it is as reasonable for the
sponsors to seek employees who adhere to “the fundamentals of the Christian faith” as
it is for the proprietors of a Thai restaurant to prefer Thai employees or the owners of a
gay bar to want “to appoint only gay staff”.87 “A right of positive selection is rather
different from discrimination”.88 The law should not proscribe reliance on
characteristics which are relevant to employment.89 Such affirmative selection is
essential to the maintenance of multiculturalism because it promotes diversity90 and
because it imbues our society with a hybrid vigour that is lost when the law imposes
homogeneity requirements.
Parkinson goes on to explain that the churches are skeptical about the
80
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implementation of further Charters in Australia since Victoria did such a poor job of
implementing the religious limitation in the ICCPR. Instead of copying it and
confirming that religious freedom should only be limited if limitation is necessary “to
protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of
others”,91 the Victorian drafters created a general balancing provision with so much
discretion that the necessity provision in Article 18(3) was eviscerated.92 But Parkinson
concedes that even the “[p]roper enactment of the protections for religious freedom in
the ICCPR” would not sweep away all the church concerns.93 The fact that Victoria
understood very well the concerns about medical doctor conscience when it passed the
Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic), did not protect that conscience at all.94 Parkinson
says that Frank Brennan was absolutely right in his scathing criticism:
This was the first real test of the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and
Responsibilities and it failed spectacularly to protect a core non-derogable
ICCPR human right.95
Even though a Victorian law which protected doctor conscience might not have
protected doctors with conscience concerns about even peripheral involvement in
abortion if that law was interpreted narrowly, still the anti-religious belief bias would
not have been as palpable.96
After noting the view of some influential Australian human rights advocates
that many religious beliefs were discriminatory and unacceptable in our pluralist,
secular society,97 Parkinson concluded that
Christians who are opposed to a Charter of Rights…would be less opposed…if
they thought that the legislators and policy makers would take all human rights
seriously, and faithfully protect freedom of religion and conscience in the
manner required by Art 18 of the ICCPR and other human rights instruments.
The suspicion that those advocating for a charter don’t take freedom of religion
and conscience nearly seriously enough – a concern which has been fuelled by
the track record of the human rights lobby and the drafting of the two Charters
that already exist in Australia – has certainly played a significant part in
enlivening opposition to a national Charter.98
Writing more recently with Joel Harrison, Parkinson has opined that the
competing dignity demands of religious believers and those who consider that their
beliefs are misogynistic and homophobic could be reconciled if it were accepted that
anti-discrimination norms should only apply in public space – the commons.99 Their
admittedly incomplete project suggests that a multicultural society needs ‘mediating
91
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institutions’; not in the sense that they facilitate balance between “two poles of
authority”,100 but in perhaps De Tocqueville’s 1830s sense that they recognize and
enable separate lawful sources of identity which protect the individual as a bulwark of
liberty against the encroaching power of the state.101
Part of the thesis of this paper is that the articulation of freedom of conscience
and religion in the UDHR and ICCPR has always been thin and incomplete. The vision
of freedom of conscience there expressed was always a work in progress and is
inadequate when compared with the legislative substance that is provided for other
freedoms in stand-alone acts that can run to 70 or more clauses. The Religion
Declaration shows that the religious part of conscience is multi-faceted and requires
more detail that was expressed in 1948 and 1966 when the UN was struggling to find
generalities acceptable behind the Iron and Bamboo curtains and in the Middle East.
Carolyn Evans has suggested internationally that the prospects of creating a more
specific and detailed Treaty or Convention to protect freedom of religion and
conscience are slim for the same reasons as in the past. 102 But that does not mean that
there is not enough material for Australia to work with in passing its own federal
Religious Freedom Act. There is enough detail in the ICCPR and the Religion
Declaration to justify comprehensive Australian legislation and as freedom of religion
and conscience has come under siege internationally, there have been many legal cases
that show how such a new Act could be framed. Indeed, I suggest that the proliferation
of litigation challenging religious conscience provides material that can enable
Australian legislators to demonstrate their commitment to freedom of conscience and
liberty. Such legislation could be so detailed and specific that it may convince the
churches and religious believers that the Parliament was ‘serious’ about freedom of
conscience and religion - to use Parkinson’s word - and ‘serious’ enough to make it
difficult for secularly minded judges to dilute the freedoms intended. The real question
is how the political will to pass such legislation could be mustered, but the answer to
that question is beyond the scope of this paper.
IV.

What a Commonwealth Religious Freedom Act could look like?

In its 1998 report entitled Article 18, Freedom of religion and belief103 HREOC
recommended that the Commonwealth enact a Religious Freedom Act which would
cover the following matters:
-

It should recognize and give effect to the right to freedom of religion and
belief104
The right of all religions to exist, organize and determine their own affairs
within the law and according to their own tenets105
All rights and freedoms recognized in Article 18 of the ICCPR and the Religion
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-

-

-

Declaration including but not limited to
a) freedom to hold a particular religion or belief
b) freedom not to hold such
c) freedom to manifest religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and
teaching
d) freedom from coercion which would impair religion or belief
e) the right of parents and guardians to organize family life in accordance with
their religion or beliefs
f) freedom from discrimination on ground of religion or belief106
such freedom of conscience and religion would be subject only to those
limitations prescribed by law and necessary to protect public safety, health or
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others107
the definition of religion would be wide and inclusive but would but not so
wide as to include beliefs occasioned by mental illness108
the obligations should apply to individuals, corporations, public and private
bodies and all other legal persons109
it should make unlawful all direct and indirect discrimination on the ground of
religion and belief in all areas of public life subject to two exceptions
a) any preference (including on grounds of religious belief) because of the
inherent requirements of a job should not be unlawful, and
b) similarly any preference (including on grounds of religious belief) because
of the need to avoid injury to the religious susceptibilities should not be
unlawful provided it is not arbitrary and is consistently applied110
the offence of blasphemy should be abolished in all States and Territories111
the advocacy of religious hatred, discrimination and violence should be
proscribed but with an exemption for good faith
a) works of art
b) any communication for a genuine academic, artistic, scientific or public
interest purpose, and
c) news reports in the public interest112
its process and remedies should be civil remedies similar to those provided in
the racial hatred provisions of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth).113

HREOC confirmed, as Professor Parkinson has noted,114 that the UN Human Rights
Committee “does not permit any limitations whatsoever on the freedom of thought or
conscience or on the freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice.”115
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HREOC continued quoting the UN Human Rights Committee, that “freedom of thought
and conscience or…the freedom to have or adopt a religion of one’s choice…are
protected unconditionally.”116 Limitations in the public interest only apply to
manifestations of religion if required by law and necessary in the interests of the public
safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
Since the Victorian Charter of Rights does not follow the ICCPR or UN General
Comment No. 22 to the extent it does not enable the unconditional protection of doctor
conscience in Victoria, it is submitted that a Commonwealth Religious Freedom Act
should be declared a code for Australia intended to ‘cover the field’ and trump any
inconsistent state legislation under s 109 of the Australian Constitution to ensure overall
Australian compliance with the applicable international instruments.117
HREOC’s Recommendation 2.3 referred specifically to Articles 1, 5 and 6 of
the Religion Declaration with non-exclusive examples. The table in appendix A
provides a list of examples including litigated cases where proponents of freedom of
conscience and religion believe that freedom of conscience and religion was not
considered properly, was unreasonably challenged or was interfered with in the result.
I suggest that the examples in the table should be used to prepare sections in a new
Commonwealth Religious Freedom Act consistent with the ICCPR and Religion
Declaration. Legislative provisions crafted to protect freedom of religious belief and
practice could ensure that judicial decisions inconsistent with freedom of religious
belief and practice are not legally possible in Australia.
The point of this discussion has been to show that if the Australian
Commonwealth Parliament chose to honour its commitments to protect freedom of
religious belief and practice under the ICCPR and the Religion Declaration, it has the
power to do so. Not only could detailed domestic legislation be tailored so that it fell
within the constitutional external affairs power, but it could be designed to satisfy the
minority religious believers who Professor Parkinson suggests have lost faith in human
rights as a way to protect their beliefs and practices.118 And if minority believers were
satisfied after a trial period that their religious liberty could be and had been
satisfactorily protected by a Commonwealth Religious Freedom Act, then the prospect
of other human rights legislation in Australia would have been enhanced.
V.

Conclusion

Visionary Australians were involved in chartering the UN, adopting the UDHR
and ratifying the ICCPR and, the ICESCR. Further visionary Australians ratified and
implemented the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (the Race Convention) and the 1981 Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. They have made Australia
116

Ibid.
Current High Court interpretation of s 109 of the Australian Constitution holds that state law
inconsistent with valid Commonwealth law passed to cover the field on a particular topic, trumps
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and Egg Pulp Marketing Board (Vic) (1942) 66 CLR 557, 573 per Latham CJ; see also Western
Australia v Commonwealth (Native Title Act Case) (1995) 183 CLR 373).
118
Above n 72.
117

https://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity/vol7/iss1/3

18

Thompson: A Commonwealth Religious Discrimination Act for Australia?

a better place. It has been slow and patient work, but their vision and persistence has
improved the Australia they left to later generations. But the most challenging
improvement envisaged by those pioneers, remains to be implemented. That is because
it has always been difficult to achieve a high level of consensus about the importance
of freedom of religious belief and practice.
I have shown that the domestic legislation of a Commonwealth Religious
Freedom Act is within the existing legislative power of the Australian Commonwealth
Parliament without the need for constitutional amendment confirmed by a referendum.
Such legislation would satisfy the commitments Australia has made to implement
Article 18 of the UDHR and the ICCPR, as well all the provisions of the Religion
Declaration. That is because there has been ‘international concern’ about freedom of
religious belief and practice since at least 1945 and because Australia has made
commitments under the international instruments that have followed. The binding
ICCPR covenant which Australia ratified in 1980, and the follow on Religion
Declaration which she ratified a year later, spell out some of the detail that could be
included in domestic implementation legislation.
I have also shown from Australian federal case law that Australian
implementation legislation does need not to correspond exactly with the international
instruments that legislation is implementing. It can be tailored to address Australia’s
unique religious belief and practice problems, provided it is reasonably adapted to that
purpose.

Published by ResearchOnline@ND, 2017

19

Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3

Appendix A
Adverse cases

Draft provision

Religious
Declaration
reference
point

Christian
Youth
Camps
Limited & Ors v Cobaw
Community Health Services
Limited & Ors [2014] VSCA
75 (16 April 2014); Lee v
Ashers Bakery Co Ltd & Anor
[2015] NICity 2; Gifford v
McCarthy (2016) NY Slip Op
00230; Elane Photography
LLC v Willock (2013) NMSC
-040, 309 P. 3d, 53; Ontario
(Human Rights Commission)
v Brockie [2002 22 DLR (4th)
174; Wheaton College v
Burwell 791 F. 3d 792 (7th
Circuit 2015)

No provider of goods or services Articles 1-4,
shall be obliged to provide services 6-8.
to any person or organization where
the provider or its directing mind has
a bona fide conscience objection to
doing so, provided that this rule shall
not apply in any case where the
conscience objection is premised on
the race or ethnic background of the
proposed service recipient. Neither
shall goods or service providers with
conscience objections breach any
anti-discrimination norm by posting
a notice in their place of business
advising potential customers of their
conscience objection to the provision
of particular goods and services

Catch the Fires Ministry Inc v
Islamic Council of Victoria
[2006] VSCA 284; Pastor
Ake Green Case B 1050 05, 29
November
2005;119
Archbishop Julian Porteous
(Tasmania, Australia – case
did not proceed); Bishop
Frederick Henry Alberta,
Canada – case did not
proceed); Chamberlain v
Surrey School District No. 36
[2002] 2 SCR 235

No person or institution involved in Articles 1-4,
the publication of any spoken or 6-8.
written material for bona fide
conscience purposes shall breach any
anti-discrimination norm by reason
of such publication, but this
protection shall not extend to any
publication required by law and
necessary in the interests of the
public safety, order, health or morals
or the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others

Eweida v British Airways PC
[2010] EWCA Civ 80;
Mandia v Dowell-Lee [1983]
2 AC 548; Sikh headgear
cases120

It shall be unlawful to pass a law or Articles 1-4,
impose a rule or policy that requires 6-8.
any person to wear or not to wear
anything that would interfere with
that person’s bona fide conscience
beliefs, but this protection shall not
extend to any item required by law

119

<https://web.archive.org/web/20120218220008/http://www.domstol.se/Domstolar/hogstadomstolen/Av
goranden/2005/Dom_pa_engelska_B_1050-05.pdf>.
120
< http://fateh.sikhnet.com/s/NYPDLandmark>.
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and necessary in the interests of the
public safety, order, health or morals
or the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others
Hozack v Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints
[1997] FCA 1300 (27
November 1997); Challenges
to Catholic Education Office
right to terminate employees
on agreed moral grounds;121
Trinity Western University v
British Columbia College of
Teachers [2001] SCR 772;
Strydom
v
Nederduitse
Gereformeede
Gemeente,
Mooreletta Park (2009) 4 SA
510 (Equality Court , TPA,
South Africa)

No employer, whether a person or an Articles 1-4,
institution, who subscribes to a bona 6-8.
fide conscience ethos, shall breach
any law by the announcement,
imposition or observance of a rule or
policy that requires employees to be
faithful to that conscience ethos if
that employer has given notice of that
conscience ethos to prospective
employees
before
the
commencement of employment. Nor
shall such employer breach any law
by taking disciplinary action
(including the termination of
employment) to enforce employee
fidelity to that conscience ethos if the
prospect of such discipline was made
clear in the pre-employment notice.

Victorian and ACT abortion No person who has a conscience Articles 1-4,
laws; College of Physicians objection to involvement in any 6-8.
and Surgeons of Ontario
medical procedure shall be required
to be involved in any process or
action touching or concerning that
medical procedure. Any employer or
institution which takes action against
such person in breach of this section
commits a Commonwealth offence.
Penalty – 1000 penalty units
Dielman; Wilkie v Preston No person who conducts a peaceful Articles 1-4,
and Stallard [2016] TAMC protest in any public place to express 6-8.
(27 July 2016)
a bona fide conscience belief, shall
breach any law, but this rule shall not
protect any peaceful protest which
physically endangers the public
safety, order, health or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of
others. For the sake of clarity, no
peaceful protest that merely offends
another person shall be deemed to
121

For example, Evans and Ujvari advise that the Catholic Education Office in Victoria seeks to
discriminate against employees who break their agreed moral code by virtue of exemptions in the
Victorian legislation (Carolyn Evans and Leilani Ujvari, “Non-discrimination laws and religious
schools in Australia”, (2009) 30 Adelaide Law Review 31, 33-35).
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have interfered with public safety,
order, health, morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of
that other person. Any person,
institution or government which
takes action against a peaceful
protester in breach of this section
commits a Commonwealth offence.
Penalty – 1000 penalty units.
Paid religious advertising No person, corporation or other Articles 1-4,
must be aired on public media institution providing commercial 6-8.
advertising to the public may refuse
to publish any advertisement or
message which has been paid for on
standard commercial terms unless
that advertisement or message would
endanger the public safety, order,
health or morals, or the fundamental
rights and freedoms of others. For the
sake of clarity, no advertisement or
message that merely offends another
person shall be deemed to have
endangered the public safety, order,
health, morals or the fundamental
rights and freedoms of that other
person. Any person, institution or
government which refuses to publish
an advertisement or message in
breach of this section commits a
Commonwealth offence. Penalty –
1000 penalty units.
Public institutions must not
take moral positions contrary
to religious belief without
consent of a majority of their
shareholders

Save for paid advertisements Articles 1 &
published
by
news
media 8; ICCPR
organisations, no corporation may Article 2.
publish any message on a moral issue
unless that corporation has first
obtained consent from a majority of
its shareholders in a general meeting
or special general meeting. Any
person, institution or government
which refuses to publish an
advertisement or message in breach
of this section commits a
Commonwealth offence. Penalty –
1000 penalty units.

Davis
v
Miller
, No person employed to provide Articles 1-4,
https://www.scribd.com/docu goods or services to the public shall
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ment/310025455/Miller-vDavis.

be required to provide those goods or 6-8.
services in breach of a bona fide
conscience objection unless the
employer gave the employee notice
of that requirement before the
commencement of employment.
Where a requirement to provide
goods or services in breach of a bona
fide conscience objection is imposed
by law after the commencement of
employment and the employer had
given no saving notice, the employer
shall thereafter be obliged to provide
the employee with alternative duties
which do not offend the employee’s
bona fide conscience objection. Any
employer which takes any action
against an employee which renders
the employee’s employment less
favourable because of the bona fide
conscience, objection commits a
Commonwealth offence. Penalty –
1000 penalty units.

Parental opt out rights for
children from education
programs contrary to their
beliefs

No parent or guardian of a child shall Article 5
be required to have the child attend
an educational program that offends
the bona fide conscience of that
parent or guardian. Any educational
institution
which
conducts
educational programs that offend the
bona fide conscience of a parent or
guardian, shall provide the child with
an alternative educational program
that does not offend the bona fide
conscience of that parent of guardian.
Any educational institution which
does not provide any child with an
education program that does not
offend the bona fide conscience of
that
parent,
commits
a
Commonwealth offence. Penalty –
1000 penalty units.
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